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The Future of Opposition in Turkey 
Overcoming Identity Politics Is the Key for Success 
Salim Çevik 
Muharrem İnce was the presidential candidate of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). 
The election results did not reflect the hopes İnce had created, and his ineptitude in 
managing the post-election process further undermined his popularity and credibil-
ity. However, İnce’s inclusive appeals throughout the campaign suggest a potentially 
successful approach for opposition parties in general and the CHP in particular. To 
challenge President Erdoğan effectively, they need to mitigate the significance of 
identity politics. 
 
When Erdoğan announced the snap elec-
tions in mid-April, few doubted he would 
win. Indeed, on 24 June Erdoğan received 
52.59 percent of the vote. Having served as 
prime minister for 11 years, Erdoğan had 
first won the presidential elections in 2014 
with nearly 52 percent of the vote, and last 
year’s referendum also passed with almost 
52 percent, transforming the parliamentary 
system into a presidential one. The results 
demonstrate a remarkable continuity of 
Erdoğan’s voter base even though the vote 
share for his Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) fluctuated between 40 and 50 percent 
during the same period. 
It is therefore possible to claim that 24 
June was merely another round in a series 
of elections in which Erdoğan won by easily 
maintaining his power base due to the 
country’s deep polarization. But during the 
electoral campaign period, the mood of 
the opposition electorate was different. It 
seemed for the first time that an alliance 
of opposition parties, the National Alliance 
(Millet İttifakı), had a reasonable chance 
of winning, and Erdoğan was on the defen-
sive. For the first time in sixteen years, 
the opposition’s campaigns overshadowed 
Erdoğan’s: they gathered larger crowds in 
rallies, set the political agenda and gained 
the upper hand in political debates. Muhar-
rem İnce, rather than Erdoğan, was the 
star of the campaign process. Yet despite a 
worsening economy and unusually inept 
political campaigning, Erdoğan won in the 
first round. There are several lessons to be 
learned from this whole process. 
The Significance of 
Identity Politics 
Commentators often claim that the binary 
approach of religious versus secular to-
wards Turkish society and politics is super-
ficial and misleading. Certainly, the country 
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is more complex than this binary picture 
suggests, yet the election results confirm 
that identity politics still dominate national 
politics. Thus, it is culture and identity rather 
than economy and policies that determine 
electoral choices. Erdoğan remains the main 
political figure in the country by safeguard-
ing the support of the conservative/religious 
majority. 
Given this context, the secular opposi-
tion mostly represented by CHP has two 
alternatives. The first involves challenging 
Erdoğan by supporting a political figure 
with a similar cultural and ideological back-
ground. This was tried in the 2014 election 
when Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a conservative 
academic, ran as the combined candidate 
of the opposition parties CHP and MHP. 
Similarly, in this election there was a failed 
attempt to nominate former president 
Abdullah Gül as the joint opposition can-
didate. Election results validate the ration-
ale behind the search for a rival conserva-
tive candidate. 
Yet there is a second alternative involv-
ing a longer perspective and greater effort: 
undermining the importance and defining 
role of identity politics. Muharrem İnce 
pursued this strategy throughout his elec-
tioneering and thereby managed to domi-
nate the campaign period. But it was evi-
dently too little and too late. Since İnce’s 
entire campaign lasted just fifty days, it 
might be wiser to not dismiss this strategy 
as a failure. This is easier said than done. 
The key to İnce’s success in dominating 
the campaign process lay in his ability to 
bring moderation to CHP’s strict identity 
politics. While often defined as a party of 
the central left, CHP’s policies throughout 
the last two decades were increasingly 
based on identity politics rather than social 
and economic issues. CHP was thus marked 
by its assertive secularism, which denied 
any religious visibility in the public realm, 
and nationalist policies that resisted at-
tempts for a peaceful solution to the Kurd-
ish problem. The minimizing of CHP’s 
identity politics was apparent on both 
fronts, secular and nationalist, and they 
should be analyzed separately. 
Coming to Terms with a 
Conservative Majority 
CHP has long objected to the public visibil-
ity of religion. By unquestioningly accept-
ing the legacy of the secularizing reforms 
and policies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
the founder of the Turkish Republic, and 
approving the repressive state policies on 
religion, CHP has estranged the conserva-
tive electorate. 
This was most evident in the party’s 
objection to the reforms enabling female 
university students and public-sector em-
ployees to wear headscarves. Given that 
the majority of Turkish women wear head-
scarves (several recent polls suggest around 
60 percent of the adult female population), 
this staunch objection inevitably limited 
the party’s power base and kept the party 
in opposition. However, Muharrem İnce 
took a radically different approach: he 
emphasized his religious upbringing, the 
religiosity of his immediate family, and his 
observance of Friday prayers; he unhesitat-
ingly declared that wearing headscarves 
would be allowed in schools and public 
institutions if he got elected. He tried to 
allay the fears of the larger conservative 
public that CHP power would undermine 
recently won religious freedoms. This was a 
bold attempt to broaden the party’s base to 
include conservatives. Although there had 
been several other attempts in this direc-
tion since Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu assumed the 
party chairmanship in 2010, İnce’s stance 
was unequivocal. Even more significantly, 
this did not create a backlash within the 
party base, a fact which demonstrates that 
the general public reached a common-sense 
agreement regarding the wearing of head-
scarves in public institutions. 
Furthermore, Millet İttifakı encompassed 
the Islamist Felicity Party (SP). The fact that 
CHP has formed an alliance with a party 
with even stronger religious credentials 
than AKP is significant, since in the past 
alliances with conservative figures or groups 
were always resisted by the secularist base 
of the party. This time, there was no oppo-
sition. Indeed, SP’s election campaign 
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which, like CHP’s, focused on socio-political 
problems rather than identity cleavages, 
thereby facilitating the party’s acceptance 
by the CHP electorate. Although it did not 
result in electoral gains, SP’s campaign re-
ceived great sympathy from other members 
of the Millet İttifakı and signaled a shift 
towards undermining identity politics in 
favor of social policies. If SP maintains this 
stance, its impact in Turkish politics in the 
long run may be heavier than its own weight. 
However, despite all the gestures regard-
ing religious practices and freedoms, İnce’s 
policy failed to make inroads on the AKP 
power base. While İnce’s own personal his-
tory and family ties strengthened his claims 
of a more friendly secularism, his rigidly 
secularist political stance in the past under-
mined his credibility. Given CHP’s decades-
long policies and İnce’s former record, his 
attempts during the fifty days of campaign-
ing remained insufficient to reach across 
the political divide. Yet in the long term 
this remains the only viable strategy for 
CHP to become electable by the conserva-
tive public. Moreover, the presidential sys-
tem and subsequent changes facilitating 
the formation of pre-election alliances force 
parties and leaders to move towards the 
center. Given that a presidential candidate 
needs 50 percent of the vote, it is clear that 
no one can challenge Erdoğan without 
appropriating his conservative constituen-
cy. This is mostly composed of lower-middle 
class and poorer segments of society, with 
a demographic that would typically lean 
towards the social policies of a leftist party. 
However, the social policies advocated by 
CHP in recent years remained under the 
shadow of identity-based polarization. Erdo-
ğan is inevitably particularly intent on con-
tinuing the current state of polarization. 
Erdoğan made it clear as soon as he was 
re-elected that he has no intention of con-
ciliation with his adversaries. 
Given the current political system and 
social demographics, CHP has no alterna-
tive but to pursue its policy of ideological 
moderation on religious issues. The party 
program already states that secularism 
must be respectful towards religious beliefs 
and practices. Yet this abstraction needs 
to be materialized vis-à-vis real-life policy 
preferences in order to appeal to the con-
servative electorate. This means a clear and 
sustained defense of religious freedoms 
extending beyond campaign periods. More 
significantly, such a policy has no signifi-
cant cost for the party making it easier to 
maintain the strategy and discourse of the 
recent electoral campaign. However, the 
picture is quite different regarding the 
second identity-based cleavage in Turkey: 
the Kurdish question. 
Moderation on the 
Kurdish Question 
Although even SP became part of the al-
liance forged by CHP, the Peoples’ Demo-
cratic Party (HDP), the main Kurdish politi-
cal party, was excluded. Despite the fact 
that HDP is a much more significant politi-
cal actor compared to SP, it was forced to run 
alone since the opposition alliance could 
not risk losing Turkish nationalist voters. 
Moreover, although İnce’s discourse 
on the Kurdish question was undoubtedly 
more favorable regarding Kurdish political 
rights compared to the CHP’s traditional 
position (which considered the problem 
primarily as a security issue), it still re-
mained largely ambiguous and superficial. 
Compared to İnce’s open and uncompro-
mising moderation concerning the party’s 
anti-religious stance, the lessening of the 
anti-Kurdish stance was still vague and 
unclear. İnce made several gestures such as 
visiting HDP’s imprisoned presidential 
candidate Selahattin Demirtaş, but he also 
very consciously avoided getting involved 
with claims about government repression 
of the electoral process in Kurdish domi-
nated regions. More significantly, although 
he was explicit on issues relating to reli-
gious freedom, he either made no comment 
or spoke deliberately ambiguously about 
the main demands of the Kurdish political 
movement, such as decentralization of the 
administration and the use of Kurdish lan-
guage in the official realm and education. It 
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seems that while the headscarf issue and 
the role of religion in public had been en-
tirely exhausted by the electorate, debates 
regarding the Kurdish question are still 
ongoing. There may be a broad consensus 
that the previous denial and assimilation 
of Kurdish people was as undemocratic as 
the exclusionary politics directed against 
religion, but there is no clear consensus 
on how to remedy this mistake. Should the 
Kurds have more autonomous regions in 
line with the principle of self-rule? Should 
Kurdish be accepted as a national language 
and/or should it be allowed as a language 
of instruction? Should Kurds be considered 
as a distinct cultural group with no extra 
group-based political rights? These ques-
tions are still hotly contested. Therefore, 
while recognition of the Kurds is now 
agreed across a large spectrum of Turkish 
society, the specific political repercussions 
of this recognition remain largely unclear. 
We can thus deduce that there is still room 
for debate and also for political maneuver-
ing in the Kurdish problem; it will likely 
continue to dominate Turkish politics for 
years to come. 
One of Erdoğan’s defining characteristics 
is his pragmatism, and over the years he 
has defended very different and sometimes 
opposing policies regarding the Kurdish 
question. However, the election results 
seem to give Erdoğan a free mandate to 
continue the hard-line nationalist policies 
he has pursued since 2015, and there 
appears to be little reason or incentive for 
another Kurdish opening. Moreover, the 
electoral alliance formed between AKP and 
the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 
and the critical, dominant role that MHP 
will hold in parliament, will force AKP to 
further its current hard-line policies on the 
Kurdish question. As long as MHP does not 
overreach by trying to dictate its policies 
and preferences in too many areas, AKP will 
not pursue a policy of a democratic solution 
to the Kurdish problem. An additional issue 
complicating the Kurdish question is the 
fact that it is now mired in the Syrian con-
flict. Available policy options will continue 
to be limited to security measures as long 
as the Kurdish PKK and its affiliates keep 
a strong presence in Northern Syria, across 
the Turkish border. Given all these con-
straints, it is highly likely that AKP will 
maintain a nationalist discourse and con-
tinue its hard-line policy concerning the 
Kurdish question for the foreseeable future. 
Challenges Ahead 
How opposition parties can respond to 
the government’s increasingly nationalist 
discourse, and the nationalist hysteria pro-
pagated by the largely government-con-
trolled media, is a far-reaching challenge. 
While the centrist-nationalist Good Party 
(İYİ Parti) has no choice but to persist in 
its nationalist position and remain an alter-
native to MHP, the Kurdish question has the 
potential to poison any future alliances that 
opposition parties might build. For the fore-
seeable future, the Kurdish question will 
remain an inflammable issue that CHP will 
try to avoid at all costs. İnce or the future 
candidate of CHP will have to maintain a 
delicate balance between Turkish national-
ism and a democratic approach to Kurdish 
politics, so as to gain the support of the 
nationalist/conservative constituencies, 
while not entirely antagonizing the politi-
cal Kurdish movement. This, rather than 
the religious secular divide, is the Achilles 
Heel of CHP’s attempts at shifting from 
identity-based policies towards those based 
on sociopolitical demands. 
Dr. Salim Çevik is a Visiting Fellow at SWP. 
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